1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations by Major Jean-Marc Pierre

Author:Major Jean-Marc Pierre [Pierre, Major Jean-Marc]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Special Forces, Middle East, Israel & Palestine, Iraq, United States
ISBN: 9781782896081
Google: YxRvCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2014-08-15T05:02:55+00:00

American Strategic Interests

President Dwight D. Eisenhower had other worries by 1956. In 1952, the former General had run for president as an anti-war candidate. The US had borne a considerable global burden since the end of World War II: the Cold War and the Korean War. The American public expected their icon to provide a peace dividend. Eisenhower therefore ran on a “Peace in Korea” platform and won the 1952 election overwhelmingly. After a 1955 heart attack, a visibly weakened Eisenhower ran for re-election in 1956. Then the Suez Crisis happened at the height of the summer campaign season with such suddenness that the Republican Party feared they could not capitalize on the President’s popularity.

Some voters understood that America had the Panama Canal and plenty of Texas oil. To them, the Suez Crisis posed no real American security concern. Still, various lobbies appealed to the President. For example, the National Federations of Syrian and Lebanese American Clubs pleaded with Eisenhower to prevent the use of force against Egypt. Exporters and oil executives urged peace to prevent the interruption of world commerce. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against the use of force, urging that the US should focus on keeping the Soviets out of the region if fighting began. Even the US Senate led by Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson made a general statement expressing the need to keep the canal operating “as the major artery of world traffic” (Divine 1974, 119-120).

Also significant in the American strategic calculation was the Tripartite Declaration Regarding the Armistice Borders of 25 May 1950. The US, Great Britain, and France agreed to allow the sale of arms to the Middle East as long as the purchasing state does not intend to “undertake any act of aggression against any other state.” In addition, they agreed to oppose any war between states in [the Middle East]. Consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, the three governments would take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violations (Kunz 1991, 197-198). When the war came, Eisenhower believed the 1950 agreement outlawed the Anglo-French strike. The British and French countered that the pact was null and void during the Israeli Operation Kadesh; the Europeans had no intention of using their troops to “defend Nasser” (Lloyd 1978, 176).

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